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A New Emergency Law Model for Egypt
By Michelle A. Liguori*
IntroductIon
Among the demands of protesters who brought about the resignation of former president Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 was the lifting of the state of emergency 
that was in place in Egypt throughout Mubarak’s nearly 30-year 
presidency and an end to abuses that occurred pursuant to 
the country’s 53-year-old emergency 
law.1 Throughout most of the ensuing 
military-led transition, the state of 
emergency and the 1958 Emergency 
Law remained, at least partially, in 
place,2 and human rights groups 
reported continued abuses.3 The state 
of emergency expired in May 2012, 
though the 1958 Emergency Law has 
not been repealed.4
A constituent assembly is currently 
in the process of drafting a new consti-
tution for Egypt,5 while protesters and 
politicians have continued to call for 
changes to the country’s emergency 
powers.6 Taking into account Egypt’s 
history and the types of emergencies 
the country is most likely to face in the 
near future, this paper proposes a new 
emergency law model that could be 
incorporated into Egypt’s new constitution.
theorIes of emergency Powers
Modern emergency powers have their origin in Ancient 
Roman law.7 The Roman Constitution provided for the Senate 
(legislative branch) to declare a state of emergency for a period 
of up to six months, during which executive authority would be 
transferred from the Consuls (executive branch) to a dictator, 
appointed by the Consuls.8 The dictator was chosen from among 
men outside the ordinary governmental apparatus known for 
their skill and virtue.9 The purpose of such powers was to enable 
the dictator to eliminate extraordinary threats to the Republic by 
authorizing him to take extraordinary actions for the duration of 
the emergency.10 However, once the threat was eliminated, the 
dictator would step aside and the republican form of government, 
with the Consuls as executives, would resume unaltered.11The 
fact that the ordinary system of government returned when the 
state of emergency expired shows that its raison d’être was to 
bring about a return to the normal constitutional order.12
The Ancient Roman model has been resurrected in modern 
times such that many modern constitutions, including those 
of France, Turkey, South Africa, and Afghanistan, authorize 
states of emergency. In fact, international law authorizes 
countries to derogate from 
their treaty obligations, if 
faced with a “public emer-
gency which threatens the 
life of the nation,” provided 
that the emergency is offi-
cially declared.13 However, 
it designates certain rights 
non-derogable, even dur-
ing an emergency, includ-
ing, inter alia, the right not 
to be discriminated against 
solely on the grounds of 
race, color, sex, language, 
religion or social origin; 
the right to life; the right 
to be free from torture and 
cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing treatment or punish-
ment; the right not to be 
convicted under retroactive criminal laws or to receive a more 
severe retroactive sentence; and the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion.14
Nonetheless, differences of opinion exist as to the optimal 
system modern democratic states should use to deal with emer-
gencies, with most scholars falling into one of three camps. 
The first camp advocates what is sometimes referred to as 
the neo-Roman model.15 Its theoretical basis was articulated, 
in modern times, by the controversial German political theo-
rist Carl Schmitt.16 Schmitt argued that the rule of law has no 
place during an emergency and that an emergency, by its nature, 
requires the suspension of democratic constitutional order.17 
Many scholars and politicians, however, have recognized that 
constitutionalized emergency powers run the risk that govern-
ment will resort to such powers more often than is necessary, 
jeopardizing the rule of law and the constitutional order, itself.18 
Critics of the neo-Roman model can point to, inter alia, the fall 
of the Weimar Republic to Nazi dictatorship after the former 
declared several states of emergency19 and the use of emergency 
measures to silence political opposition in Egypt during its pro-
longed state of emergency.20
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However, the notion that emergencies require 
extraordinary measures that are outside the normal 
legal system and that it is best to provide a prescribed, 
limited, and temporary set of emergency measures to 
be used to deal with such emergencies continues to be 
embraced by many.21 The advantage of such a model 
is that, at the end of the emergency, the normal consti-
tutional system can be restored intact.
Countries using the neo-Roman model often 
adopt a number of safeguards to prevent overuse of 
constitutional emergency powers by giving authority 
over different aspects of the powers to different branches 
of the government.22 In practice, emergency laws 
vary in the branch that has responsibility for: declar-
ing the state of emergency (usually the executive23), 
enacting emergency measures (usually the executive), 
executing emergency measures (usually the executive), 
extending and/or terminating the state of emergency 
(usually the legislature), and reviewing actions taken 
in response to the emergency (usually the judiciary, if 
any). Some countries spell out certain rights, usually 
those identified as non-derogable under international 
law, that may not be restricted in order to deal with the emer-
gency.24 Many countries also provide in their constitutions or 
supplementary legislation that emergency measures expire once 
the state of emergency is terminated.25
The second camp is uncomfortable with creating a secondary 
legal system to be used during times of emergency, on the 
grounds that authorizing periods during which the government 
is not subject to normal checks and balances presents too great a 
threat to the rule of law. The United States is, to some extent, an 
example of this second model, sometimes called the “legality” 
model.26 
A prominent adherent of the legality model is David 
Dyzenhaus. Dyzenhaus accepts that the executive will have to 
take decisive action during an emergency, but he calls on the 
legislature and judiciary to ensure that the response to the emer-
gency is not outside the rule of law.27 Dyzenhaus argues that 
the courts, in particular, should scrutinize executive emergency 
actions,28 whereas scholars such as Posner and Vermeule argue 
that courts are ill-equipped to determine appropriate responses 
to emergency situations and should defer to the executive, at 
least during the heat of the emergency.29 
In fact, most advanced democracies, even those whose 
constitutions follow the neo-Roman model, rarely declare states 
of emergency in response to threats to their national secu-
rity.30 Because of the rule of law concerns raised by states of 
emergency, such countries tend to use ordinary legislation that 
delegates exceptional powers to the executive branch; however, 
this legislation does not suspend the constitutional order and 
is subject to judicial review, like ordinary legislation.31 Along 
these lines, Dyzenhaus emphasizes that for the legality model to 
work, all branches of government, and the general public, must 
have a firm commitment to the rule of law.32 Others have noted 
that it also requires a legislature capable of quickly agreeing on 
legislation authorizing the executive to take decisive action.33
The danger with the legality model is that actions taken in 
response to an emergency will permanently transform the consti-
tutional system in a less rights-protective manner.34 A number of 
scholars have expressed this concern about legislation passed in 
the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
some of whom have proposed a new model of emergency powers.35
The third camp, sometimes called the “extra-legal measures 
model,”36 is skeptical both of prescribed emergency powers and 
of relying on courts to serve as a check on extraordinary mea-
sures on the grounds that both threaten to constitutionalize the 
exception. Adherents of this view believe that political, rather 
than judicial, checks on the executive are the best way to prevent 
executive overreaching through emergency actions. 37 
Oren Gross, a member of this camp, proposes a constitution 
that authorizes the executive to take whatever actions he or she 
deems necessary to deal with an emergency situation, provided 
that, after they go into effect, the executive’s actions will be 
put up for a popular referendum, either directly or through the 
people’s legislative representatives. 38 If the people determine 
that the actions cannot be supported by the constitution, they can 
subject the executive to legal and/or political sanction.39 As with 
the legality model, for the extra-legal measures model, with its 
reliance on a political check, to work, the people, or at least their 
representatives in Gross’ model, must have a firm commitment 
to the rule of law.40
History of EmErgEncy PowErs in EgyPt
The emergency powers in Egypt’s 1971 Constitution, as 
amended, which governed the country until March 2011, largely 
followed the neo-Roman model. Article 148 gave the president 
authority to declare a state of emergency.41 Article 148 further 
provided that the state of emergency would last 15 days, after 
which approval by the legislature was required.42 The Article did 
not specify a time limit for the state of emergency, other than 
to say that it would be limited, and that any extension required 
legislative approval.43 The state of emergency is further regu-
lated by Law No. 162 of 1958 (which has not been repealed), 
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which, inter alia, authorizes the president to restrict freedom of 
assembly, detain suspects for up to six months without a hearing, 
and conduct searches without a warrant during a state of 
emergency.44 
The 1971 Constitution also contained several provisions that 
gave the president extraordinary powers to deal with exigent 
situations, but which did not require the declaration of a state of 
emergency. Article 74 authorized the president to take “urgent 
measures” necessary to deal with threats to national unity, the 
safety of the nation, or the constitutional role of state institu-
tions, after consulting the prime minister and the speakers of 
both houses of the legislature.45 Article 74 required the presi-
dent to hold a public referendum on any such actions within 60 
days.46 Similarly, Article 108 of the 1971 Constitution provided 
that the legislature could delegate power to the president to enact 
decrees having the force of law, “in times of necessity,” subject 
to the approval of the prime minister.47
Historically, the emergency clause in Article 148 has been 
the most important. In fact, Egypt was in a nearly continuous 
state of emergency from 1967 through May of this year. In 
1967, the first president of the Egyptian Republic, Gamel Abd 
Al-Nasser, declared a state of emergency during 
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.48 It was briefly lifted 
by Nasser’s successor, Anwar Al-Sadat, but was 
reinstated by Mubarak after Sadat’s assassina-
tion in October 1981.49 The state of emergency 
was repeatedly renewed by the legislature, most 
recently in May 2010. 50 
Human rights watch groups recorded systematic 
human rights abuses by Mubarak’s government, 
under the guise of emergency measures.51 Not 
surprisingly, lifting of the state of emergency 
and revocation of the 1958 Emergency Law were 
among the demands of anti-government protest-
ers that ultimately brought about the fall of the 
Mubarak regime.52
Following Mubarak’s resignation in February 
2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(“SCAF”) assumed control of the country. 53 The 
SCAF suspended the 1971 Constitution, leaving 
the state of emergency in place;54 however, it 
issued a Constitutional Declaration in March 2011 (after input 
from a popular referendum) that replaced the 1971 Constitution 
and revised its emergency provisions.55 As under the prior 
constitution, the Constitutional Declaration gives the president 
authority to declare a state of emergency, though he or she must 
first consult the cabinet.56 The Declaration also provides that the 
state of emergency must be approved by the legislature within 
seven days and that it is limited to a period of six months, after 
which it can only be extended in a national referendum.57
Despite frequent exhortations against the state of emer-
gency and the 1958 emergency law by Egyptian demonstra-
tors, 58 human rights organizations,59 and foreign govern-
ments,60 the SCAF left both, at least partially, in place after 
Mubarak’s resignation. In September 2011, the SCAF issued 
a decree that expanded the state of emergency, approved by 
the People’s Assembly to cover terrorism and drug trafficking 
in March 2010, to a number of additional threats, including 
internal disturbances, public system disruption and its financ-
ing, ownership and trading of weapons, bullying, obstructions 
to transportation, broadcasting false information, and spreading 
rumors.61 However, in January 2012, the SCAF lifted the state 
of emergency for all offenses other than “thuggery,” a term the 
“Human rights watch groups recorded systematic human 
rights abuses by Mubarak’s government, under the guise of 
emergency measures. Not surprisingly, lifting of the state 
of emergency and revocation of the 1958 Emergency Law 
were among the demands of anti-government protesters that 
ultimately brought about the fall of the Mubarak regime.”
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SCAF left undefined,62 and in May it let the state of emergency 
completely expire for the first time in over 30 years.63
Diagnosis of Egypt’s prior EmErgEncy Laws
In diagnosing Egypt’s emergency powers, the typical division 
of powers over neo-Roman states of emergency discussed 
earlier should be kept in mind. Under this framework, Egypt’s 
emergency laws, both under the 1971 Constitution and the 2011 
Constitutional Declaration do not appear terribly problematic. 
One notable deficiency in the 1971 Constitution (which has been 
modified in the Constitutional Declaration) is the absence of a 
specified time limit for states of emergency. Another is the lack 
of an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the judiciary to review exec-
utive emergency actions. Unsurprisingly, the Egyptian Supreme 
Constitutional Court, since its creation, largely declined to review 
the executive’s exercise of emergency powers by upholding 
the president’s authority to prosecute offenses related to the 
state of emergency in Emergency State Security Courts, which 
were presided over by a mixed 
panel of judges and military 
officers and did not provide a 
right of appeal.64
In addition, as mentioned, 
many countries’ constitutions 
specify that certain funda-
mental rights may never be 
restricted, even during states 
of emergency. Neither Egypt’s 
1971 Constitution nor its 2011 
Constitutional Declaration 
specify non-derogable rights, 
and reports have shown that 
the Egyptian government 
systematically violated rights 
regarded as non-derogable 
under international law, such 
as the right to be free from 
torture and cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or 
punishment.65
However, the standard neo-Roman emergency law discussed 
above is designed to work in a republic that is based on the sepa-
ration of powers; whereas, since the founding of the Egyptian 
Republic in 1953,66 power has historically been concentrated in 
the executive branch.67 In fact, prior to Mubarak’s resignation 
in 2011, Egypt was widely regarded as a de facto single-party 
state, with the executive controlling access to the legislature and 
judiciary.68 However, while it had limited room to maneuver, the 
judiciary, in particular the Supreme Constitutional Court, has 
been able to exercise a significant degree of independence, and 
has, at times, served as a constitutional check on the executive.69 
Given these institutional characteristics, in particular the 
legislature’s weakness, it becomes apparent that Egypt’s prior 
emergency powers suffered from the absence of a meaningful 
check on the decision to declare, extend, and/or terminate the 
state of emergency, the most used emergency power in the 1971 
Constitution. They also suffered to the extent that the judiciary, 
the branch best placed to serve as a check on the executive, was 
not given explicit authority to do so. While the existence of a 
de facto single-party state may have made the creation of 
a meaningful check on the executive impossible,70 explicit 
constitutional authority for the judiciary to review executive 
emergency actions would have been the most likely to succeed.
a nEw moDEL for Egypt
The emergency law contemplated in this paper will be the 
product of a new constitution, which is expected to reshape the 
balance of power among the three branches of the Egyptian 
government.71 In contemplating the best model for Egypt mov-
ing forward, it is useful to consider the types of challenges the 
country is likely to face in the near future. 
Throughout the military-led transition, the role of the SCAF 
and the progression of the transition, itself, have been ardently 
contested in street protests, which have, on a number of occa-
sions, escalated into violent confrontation between protesters 
and security forces, resulting 
in scores of deaths.72 In addi-
tion to the danger of rioting 
sparked by further protest-
ing, the most cited threats 
to the new constitutional 
order include terrorism, drug 
trafficking, and sectarian 
violence.
Terrorism has historically 
been regarded as a serious threat 
within Egypt, as is evidenced 
by the 2007 Amendment to the 
1971 Constitution, authorizing 
the legislature to restrict fun-
damental rights in measures 
designed to combat terrorism.73 
Terrorism was also cited, along 
with drug trafficking, as one 
of the reasons for the state of 
emergency renewal in 2010,74 
and it was included in the list 
of reasons for the SCAF’s 
state of emergency degree in September 2011.75 In addition, 
since former President Mubarak resigned in February 2011, sev-
eral terrorist attacks were launched in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, 
most of which were directed at the Sinai gas pipeline.76
The third often cited danger is sectarian violence between 
Muslims (roughly 90% of the population) and Christians 
(roughly 10%),77 which has increased in recent years,78 and 
which some fear could intensify in the future.79 Egypt may also 
have to deal with urban rioting, along the lines of clashes that 
occurred in February of this year in a Port Said soccer stadium, 
in which more than 70 people were killed, and which were 
followed by several days of rioting in Cairo.80
Professor Victor V. Ramraj, a noted scholar on emergency 
powers, observes that nascent democracies must work to channel 
political disagreements into political processes and institu-
tions in a way that makes the resolution of such disputes seem 
legitimate to the disputing parties.81 He notes that developing 
“… Egypt’s prior emergency 
powers suffered from the 
absence of a meaningful check 
on the decision to declare, 
extend, and/or terminate the 
state of emergency, the most 
used emergency power in the 
1971 Constitution.”
100303_AU_HRB195.indd   13 9/25/12   8:42 AM
14
democracies are likely to confront violent opposition during this 
channeling process and argues that, though emergency powers, 
by their nature, entail derogation from constitutional rights and 
procedures, their proper use can help governments demonstrate 
their commitment to constitutional checks and the rule of law.82 
In Egypt’s case, Ramraj’s advice counsels for a system of 
emergency powers that sufficiently enables the government to 
deal with serious threats to its legitimacy while visibly limiting 
its actions and providing accountability. Along these lines, it 
would be beneficial for Egypt’s new emergency powers to look 
significantly different from the old ones in order to signal a 
change in the government’s approach to dealing with emergencies, 
especially given the extent of opposition expressed to the previous 
regime’s use of emergency powers, both before, during, and after 
the protests that forced Mubarak to resign in early 2011.
Given the desirability of such limits and the relatively 
immature state of democracy and demonstrated commitment to 
the rule of law in Egypt, it seems most appropriate that Egypt 
include a neo-Roman emergency law, which spells out permis-
sible emergency actions, and procedures to be followed to activate 
them, before an emergency is declared. While this model risks 
overuse if it lacks appropriate safeguards, it seems more appro-
priate than either a pure legality or extra-legal measures model, 
both of which require internalization of a system of constitu-
tional limits on government action. 
However, Egypt’s history with long-term states of emergency 
during which human rights abuses were systematically committed 
also counsels for retaining a form of exceptional powers for the 
president in the new constitution. Mubarak’s successors may 
have strong political reasons not to declare states of emergency, 
even if faced with situations that call for extraordinary measures. 
Such was the case in Indonesia, where, as in Egypt, massive 
street demonstrations caused a long-serving authoritarian presi-
dent to resign and ushered in a transition to a democratic form of 
government.83 President Habibie, the first Indonesian president 
after the transition, refused the military’s request for a declara-
tion of martial law in Indonesia’s Aceh region because of the 
history of systematic human rights abuses committed there.84 
As such, it would be beneficial to provide the Egyptian president 
with another option for taking immediate action in response to 
an emergency situation, without having to officially declare a 
state of emergency, provided that the alternative option also has 
political and judicial checks.
Finally, the competencies of different branches of government 
should be kept in mind, both in regards to Egypt, specifically, 
and more generally. Egypt’s institutional history, as discussed 
above, counsels against relying on the legislature to check 
the executive’s emergency actions and for giving the Supreme 
Constitutional Court a significant role. However, scholars such 
as Posner and Vermeule counsel against judicial review of 
emergency actions, on the grounds that judges are ill-equipped 
to gather information and make judgments about what national 
security requires,85 which counsels against relying on the 
Supreme Constitutional Court as the primary or exclusive check 
on the executive. 
It is also useful to note the use of popular referenda to check 
the Egyptian president’s emergency actions, both in Article 74 of 
the 1971 Constitution and the emergency provision of the 2011 
Constitutional Declaration. While, to the author’s knowledge, 
the provisions that require popular approval have never been 
used, they suggest that the Egyptian people may be well placed 
to serve as an effective check on the executive branch, given the 
right circumstances.
Nonetheless, there are a number of drawbacks to relying on 
referenda, including cost and time concerns and the history of 
sectarian violence in Egypt, which counsels against relying too 
heavily on a popular check to protect minority rights during an 
emergency. The possibility of a sectarian emergency also coun-
sels against overreliance on the legislature as a check, especially 
given the fact that self-identifying Islamists controlled a majority 
of seats in the country’s first post-Mubarak parliament (which has 
since been dissolved).86 Altogether, the possibility of a sectarian 
emergency also counsels for a role for a counter-majoritarian 
institution, namely, the Supreme Constitutional Court.
Along these lines, some have expressed concern that Egypt 
is on the way to becoming a single-party state once again, 
this time with power concentrated in the hands of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, which controlled 
nearly a majority of seats in the country’s first post-Mubarak 
parliament and now occupies the presidency.87 If this scenario 
does come to pass, it may be impossible to create meaningful 
checks on the executive’s use of emergency powers, given that 
the ruling party in a single-party state, by its nature, controls 
access to the governmental institutions that could serve as a 
check. This paper proposes a model that is most likely to succeed, 
keeping in mind that its suggestions may be of limited effective-
ness should a single-party system emerge again.
ProPosal
This paper proposes that Egypt adopt two types of emergency 
powers in its new constitution: one based on the neo-Roman 
model, with a formal declaration of emergency and prescribed 
Egypt’s constitution…should categorically prohibit 
the restriction of rights deemed non-derogable under 
international law, including the right to be free from torture 
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
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emergency measures that may restrict ordinary constitutional 
norms, and the other largely based on the legality model, allowing 
the executive to take actions outside the normal constitutional pro-
cedure in the face of an emergency situation without declaring 
a state of emergency, provided that such actions are subject to 
immediate ratification by the legislature and judicial review for 




tion should authorize 
the declaration of a 
state of emergency, 
in the event of a 
threat to the consti-
tutional order that 
cannot be managed 
through the ordinary 
constitutional pro-
cess, during which 
constitutional rights 
may be temporarily 
restricted. However, 
it should categori-
cally prohibit the restriction of rights deemed non-derogable 
under international law,88 including the right to be free from tor-
ture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
The new constitution should also provide for both civil and 
military states of emergency, as do French89 and Turkish law.90 The 
option for a military emergency is desirable, especially given the cur-
rent weakness of the Egyptian police force, due in part to its violent 
response to anti-government protests that brought about 
Mubarak’s resignation.91 The measures that may be used in 
response to an emergency situation should, pursuant to the 
neo-Roman model, be specified, either in the constitution, or 
in new supplementary legislation that would displace the 1958 
Emergency Law. Given Egypt’s history, it may be beneficial to 
include in the legislation a provision regarding when security 
officials are authorized to fire on protesters, as does Turkish 
law.92 The prescription of emergency powers will serve both 
to limit the restriction of constitutional rights and to provide 
a guideline by which actions actually taken can be evaluated. 
Should additional authorities be required during the state of 
emergency, supplementary legislation would have to be promul-
gated by the legislature, using the normal legislative process.
All three branches of government, and the population 
at large, should be given a role in managing states of emergency. 
A breakdown of the recommended division follows.
Declaring states of emergency
The power to declare a state of emergency should be given 
to the president.93 The state of emergency should require the 
approval of a simple majority of the legislature within fourteen 
days.94 The legislature, as a political branch that is likely to 
have access to information about existing threats to the nation 
and can be convened relatively easily (compared to a national 
referendum), is well placed to serve as the first check on the 
president’s invocation of emergency powers. The initial state of 
emergency should terminate after three months, unless renewed. 
While not all countries explicitly limit the duration of an initial 
state of emergency, many, such as South Africa and Turkey, limit 
it a period of 21 days95 and six months, 96 respectively.97 This 
paper recommends an initial duration of three months, given 
Egypt’s history with 
extended states of 
emergency, but keep-
ing in mind the desir-




termination of the 
state of emergency
After the initial 
three months, the 
president should be 
able to request fur-
ther extension of the 
state of emergency. 
Renewal in three-
month intervals, a period also used by South Africa,98 is rec-
ommended, again, as a middle ground between the desire for 
both time limitation and preserving flexibility of action.99 The 
first renewal should be by a simple majority of the legislature, 
given that legislatures, in general, have relative competence in 
serving as a check on executives’ use of emergency powers. 
However, given Egypt’s institutional history, the second renewal 
should require approval by the Supreme Constitutional Court, 
which should be given jurisdiction to determine whether the 
factual conditions for a state of emergency continue to exist. The 
Supreme Constitutional Court, which, as noted, has a history of 
serving as a check on Egypt’s executive branch, will also serve 
as a counter-majoritarian check that will help to protect rights of 
minorities during emergencies.
Also keeping in mind the role of constitutional referenda in 
Egypt, the third and all subsequent extensions should require 
approval of the people in a referendum. While referenda may be 
costly, they are not novel in Egypt, and they would help to ensure 
that the president is accountable to the people in his or her use of 
emergency powers. The fact that the second extension requires 
the approval of the Supreme Constitutional Court also ensures 
that the people will have available to them a judicial determina-
tion that the state of emergency was appropriate before they are 
called on to vote to extend it.
Oversight of emergency actions
Egypt’s constitution and supplementary emergency legisla-
tion should explicitly provide a right of action and a right of 
compensation for actions taken in violation of the prescribed 
emergency measures and constitutional guarantees of non-
derogable rights.100 Such provisions would ensure that, while the 
president may authorize actions consistent with the extraordinary 
Photo courtesy of Jonathan Rashad.
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powers granted in emergency legislation, his or her actions are 
limited and can be challenged in a court of law. In addition, the 
constitution should provide that, should the executive branch 
choose to try defendants in military or security courts, con-
victed defendants have a right 
to appeal their convictions in an 
ordinary civilian court. Such a 
provision (similar to the right of 
habeas corpus in the American 
Constitution101) would balance 
preserving the president’s ability 
to use military or security courts, 
to the extent they may be neces-
sary, with defendants’ interna-
tionally recognized human right 
to a fair trial before an impartial 
tribunal.102
ExcEptional powErs of 
thE prEsidEnt
A number of countries’ con-
stitutions, in addition to autho-
rizing states of emergency, 
authorize the chief executive 
to take extraordinary actions, 
in certain situations, without 
declaring a state of emergency. Article 16 of the French 
Constitution authorizes the president to take any measures he or 
she deems necessary, in the event of a “serious and immediate 
threat” to the nation, its institutions, or its international com-
mitments. After thirty days, such measures are reviewable by 
the Conseil Constitutionnel.103 As referenced above, Indonesia’s 
constitution provides an exigency power for the president that 
may be exercised outside a state of emergency, and which is, at 
least partially, judicially reviewable.104 In addition, Article 74 of 
the 1971 Egyptian Constitution authorized the president to take 
“urgent measures” in the event of “[danger threatening] national 
unity or the safety of the motherland or [obstructing] the consti-
tutional role of the state institutions.”105
Egypt’s history with abuse of emergency powers counsels 
for providing an alternative to a neo-Roman state of emergency. 
Egypt’s “exceptional powers” should be modeled on Indonesia’s 
exigency power, which allows the president to issue decrees 
having the force of law, which are immediately submitted to 
the legislature for ratification.106 The use of exceptional pow-
ers should, as in Indonesia, be 
subject to judicial review.107 
However, Egypt’s new constitu-
tion should explicitly provide 
for judicial review of the excep-
tional powers, and it should 
explicitly state that the exercise 
of such powers does not per-
mit the president to derogate 
constitutional rights. As such, 
the exceptional powers would 
give the president a degree of 
flexibility to act in response to 
an emergency situation, with-
out triggering an official state 
of emergency, while giving the 
judiciary jurisdiction to protect 
the constitutional rights of citi-
zens. Presumably, the judiciary 
would have discretion to defer 
to the political branches, per 
Posner and Vermeule.
conclusion
The process of drafting a new democratic constitution with 
a more robust separation of powers is currently underway in 
Egypt. Since before the massive protests that brought about 
former President Mubarak’s resignation in February of last 
year, pro-democracy activists have been calling for changes 
to the emergency powers that gave the Egyptian president 
extensive authority to restrict constitutional rights. Keeping in 
mind Egypt’s experience with states of emergency in the past 
and emergencies the country may face in the future, this paper 
proposed an innovative emergency law model that would allow 
the newly constituted Egyptian state to combat serious threats to 
its vitality while maintaining a commitment to the rule of law.
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